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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH, by and through DIVISION
OF FORESTRY, FIRE & STATE LANDS,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
TOOELE COUNTY, UTAH; SIX MILE
RANCH COMPANY, a Utah corporation;
CRAIG S. BLEAZARD, an individual;
MARK C. BLEAZARD, an individual; and
JOHN C. BLEAZARD, an individual.

Appeal No. 20000493-SC
Priority No. 15 (Subject to
Assignment to Court of Appeals)

Defendants/Appellees.

OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a summary judgment (R. 345-48; Addendum A) in favor of
defendants that was entered in the Third Judicial District Court on May 8,2000. The
State of Utah filed a timely notice of appeal on June 6, 2000. Pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §§ 78-2-2(j) and 78-2a-3(2) (1996), the Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of the
appeal.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Did former Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-102.4 (Supp. 1993) (Addendum B) require
Tooele County to give written notice of the Petition to Vacate the West Stansbury Road to

1

abutting landowners, in addition to notice by publication?
2. If so, did the statute require written notice to the State of Utah, an owner of
record of public lands abutting the part of West Stansbury Road to be vacated, even
though the State does not pay property taxes?
Preservation: These issues were preserved in the Appellant's Memoranda (R. 96106, 125-27, 320-24), Tooele County's Memorandum Opposing Summary Judgment (R.
117), the other Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment (R. 287-91, 284-85), at oral argument on the motion (R. 355 ), in the trial
court's bench ruling (R. 355 at 42-45; Addendum C), and in its order granting summary
judgment (R. 345-48).
Standards of Review: Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Surety Underwriters v. E &C Trucking, Inc., 2000 UT 71, f 15; State ex rel Utah Air
Quality Board v. Truman Mortensen Family Trust, 2000 UT 67, f 16; Utah R. Civ. P.
56(c). On appeal of a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court determines if the
trial court erred in applying the governing law. Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915
P.2d 1060,1063 (Utah 1996). Interpretations of a statute present questions of law
reviewed for correctness, with no deference to the trial court. Lieber v. ITT Hartford
Insurance Center, Inc., 2000 UT 72, f7; Stephens v. Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d
518, 519 (Utah 1997). Moreover, in reviewing a grant of summary judgment an appellate

2

court views the facts and the reasonable factual inferences drawn therefrom in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, here, the State of Utah. See Surety Underwriters
v. E &C Trucking, Inc., 2000 UT 71, f 15; Glover ex rel Dyson v. Boy Scouts of
America, 923 P.2d 1383, 1384 (Utah 1996).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
The full text of relevant statutes is included in Addendum B.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE/ STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case involves the State's challenge to a Tooele County ordinance purporting
to vacate the north end of a public road, called here the West Stansbury Road. This road
provided the general public and the State's employees and lessees access to State
sovereign lands on and around Stansbury and Badger Islands in the Great Salt Lake. (R.
7-11). These sovereign lands were acquired by the State of Utah at statehood in 1896
from the United States. They comprise lake bed that is always underwater as well as all
land below the peripatetic lake's surveyed meander line, land that is submerged in some
years and exposed in others. See Utah v. United States, 420 U.S. 304, 305 (1975); Utah
v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 13 (1971); see also State v. Rolio, 262 P. 987, 994 (Utah
1927) (taking judicial notice of fact that, on Utah's admission to the Union, fee title to all

'During 150 years of measurements, the lake's elevation above sea level has
oscillated 21 feet. William Lee Stokes, The Great Salt Lake 22-23 (1984). The surveyed
meander line is shown in black and the sovereign lands are shown in grey and light blue
in Figure 1, a portion of the map used in the trial court and included here as Addendum D.
3

lands underlying navigable waters vested in the State in its sovereign capacity).
Sovereign lands are public lands held in trust for the people of Utah, see Utah
Const, art. XX, and managed by the Division, Utah Code Ann. § 65A-10-1 (1996). The
Division's statutory powers and duties for managing the Great Salt Lake include carrying
out a comprehensive plan for the lake that recognizes policies to
(a) develop strategies to deal with a fluctuating lake level;
(b) encourage development of the lake in a manner which will preserve the
lake, encourage availability of brines to lake extraction industries, protect
wildlife, and protect recreational facilities;
(c) maintain the lake's flood plain as a hazard zone;
(d) promote water quality management for the lake and its tributary streams;
(e) promote the development of lake brines, minerals, chemicals, and petrochemicals to aid the state's economy;
(f) encourage the use of appropriate chemicals for extractions of brine,
minerals, chemicals, and petro-chemicals;
(g) maintain the lake and the marshes as important to the waterfowl flyway
system;
(h) encourage the development of an integrated industrial complex;
(i) promote and maintain recreation areas on and surrounding the lake;
(j) encourage safe boating use of the lake;
(k) maintain and protect state, federal, and private marshlands, rookeries,
and wildlife refuges;
(1) provide public access to the lake for recreation, hunting, and fishing.
Utah Code Ann. § 65A-10-8 (1996). The public's right of access to all state lands for
hunting, trapping and fishing-including lands below the Great Salt Lake's meander
line-is statutorily guaranteed. Utah Code Ann. § 23-21-4(1) (Supp. 2000).
Defendants, the Bleazards and Six Mile Ranch Co., own the private lands that
West Stansbury Road traverses, in a roughly north-south direction, along the western side
of Stansbury Island. These private lands are shown in white on Figure 1 (next page) and
4
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Addendum D, and the road is shown as a red line, indicated on Figure 1 with an orange
arrow. In the far north, the West Stansbury Road ends at a dike over state sovereign
lands, operated by the State's lessee there, MagCorp, that provides vehicle access to
Badger Island (R. 8-11; R. 355 at 26-27). The road had been designated a Class B road,
i.e., a county road, and maintained as a public road by Tooele County since at least the
early 1960s; it was shown as a county road on Tooele County Road Maps in 1991 and
1993. (R. 177, 299-300). See Utah Code Ann. § 72-3-103 (Supp. 2000) (formerly Utah
Code Ann. § 27-12-22). Under former section 27-12-90, all public highways continued
to be such until abandoned or vacated by the governmental entity with authority to do so.
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-90 (1996) (renumbered 1998; now see Utah Code Ann. § 72-5105 (Supp. 2000)).
Pursuant to former Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-102.1 (Supp. 1993),2 the defendant
abutting landowners petitioned Tooele County in early 1993 to vacate that portion of the
West Stansbury Road from where it enters the south end of defendants' private land to the
road's terminus at the north end of defendants' private land. (R. 192-96). See Figure 1.
The statute permitted the county to vacate a county road by ordinance if satisfied, after
notice and hearing, that there was "good cause" and that it would not be "detrimental to

2

Now see Utah Code Ann. § 72-3-108 (Supp. 2000). The full text of these statutes
is included in Addendum B.
5

the general interest." Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-102.1 (Supp. 1993).3
Unless all owners of property abutting the road to be vacated gave written consent
to the county, Utah law stated that notice "shall in all cases be given as provided in
Section 27-12-102.4." Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-102.3 (Supp. 1993). The referenced
section provided:
No county road shall be so vacated, unless notice of the pendency of
the petition and prayer thereof, and the date of the hearing thereon, if such
petition is filed, or of the intention of the county legislative body of the
county to vacate, and the date of the hearing on such question if no petition
is filed, be given by publishing in a newspaper published or of general
circulation in such county once a week for four consecutive weeks
preceding action on such petition or intention, or, where no newspaper is
published in the county by posting the notice in three public places therein
for four consecutive weeks preceding such petition, and by mailing such
notice to all owners of record of land abutting the county road proposed to
be vacated addressed to the mailing address appearing on the rolls of the
county assessor of the county wherein said land is located
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-102.4 (Supp. 1993) (now see Utah Code Ann. § 72-3-108(2)
(Supp. 2000)).
Notice of the defendants' petition to vacate the northern portion of West Stansbury
Road was published in the Tooele Transcript-Bulletin once each week for four
consecutive weeks ending June 8,1993. (R. 94,107). Notice of the petition and hearing
was not mailed to the State or other record owners of land abutting the portion of the

3

Even after a public road is properly vacated under the statutes, an abutting
landowner retains a private easement of access along the vacated portion in order to reach
her property. See Mason v. State, 656 P.2d 465,468 (Utah 1982); Adney v. State Road
Common, 248 P. 811, 812 (Utah 1926).
6

West Stansbury Road defendants wanted vacated. (R. 88-93, 107; R. 355 at 15, 18).
Tooele County held a public hearing on the petition on June 13, 1993 at which the State
was not present. (R. 107, 112; see also R. 355 at 18).
The Tooele County Board of Commissioners, by a 2-1 vote, later adopted
Ordinance 93-9 vacating the northern portion of the West Stansbury Road after
summarily concluding there was good cause to do so and that it would not be detrimental
to the public interest. (R. 82-83; Addendum E). The defendant private landowners then
erected a locked gate across the southern end of the vacated portion of West Stansbury
Road, blocking public access to the sovereign lands on and around Stansbury and Badger
Islands. (R. 7-8).
The State of Utah's Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands brought this suit
seeking to invalidate Ordinance 93-9 because of the failure of the County to comply with
section 27-12-102.4 by giving the State, as a record owner of sovereign lands abutting the
portion of West Stansbury Road to be vacated, written notice of the petition to vacate and
the public hearing thereon. (R. 13). The State alleged that: the road was used for
decades by the Utah public for recreational access to the Great Salt Lake and to sovereign
lands on Stansbury and Badger Islands, as well as for access by search-and-rescue and
law enforcement personnel; it was also used for access by the State's commercial lessees
and permittees of sovereign lands there, such as brine shrimp harvesters and mineral
extractors; and, alternatively, that defendant landowners had acquired their property in

7

patents from the State that expressly subjected the private lands to the then pre-existing
public roadway. (R. 10-11; see also R. 90-91, Affidavit in Support of State's Motion for
Summary Judgment, R. 355 at 20).
The State eventually filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming Ordinance
93-9 is void because the county did not give the State, an abutting owner, written notice
of the petition to vacate and the hearing on it.4 (R. 79-80). The defendant Tooele County
opposed the motion, disputing that the State is an owner of record of land on Stansbury
island abutting the vacated portion of West Stansbury and asserting that the State's
mailing address for any such land does not appear on the rolls of the Tooele County
assessor. (R. 112-18). Defendants Bleazard and Six Mile Ranch also opposed the
State's motion, arguing that the State is not an abutting landowner. (R. 280-83, 292, 294,
333, 338; R. 355 at 26-27).
In addition, these defendants filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 16970) on the statutory noncompliance claim, contending first that section 27-12-102.4 does
not require written notice to abutting landowners if notice is published, as it was here (R.
287-92, 337; R. 355 at 30-31). Second, defendants argued, even if section 27-12-102.4
required written notice in addition to publication, the State was not among those abutting
landowners on Stansbury Island entitled to written notice under the statute because it is

4

This appeal does not involve other bases for summary judgment asserted by, but
decided adversely to, the State.
8

not a private, and thus a tax-paying, landowner whose address is listed on the rolls of the
Tooele County Assessor (R. 284, 337; R. 355 at 20-22, 32-33). Defendant Tooele County
concurred in these arguments at the April 12, 2000 hearing on the competing motions. (R.
355 at 18-20).
The trial court ruled that there was a dispute about whether the State was an
abutting landowner. (R. 355 at 42). This material factual dispute precluded summary
judgment for the State on its statutory noncompliance claim. See Bill Brown Realty, Inc.
v. Abbott, 562 P.2d 238, 239 (Utah 1977).
For purposes of deciding the defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment,
however, the trial court assumed the State of Utah was an abutting landowner under
former section 27-12-102.4. Agreeing with defendants, District Judge David S. Young
first concluded that the statute did not require written notice to abutting landowners since
notice by publication had been made. In any event, Judge Young concluded next, even if
the statute additionally required written notice to abutting landowners, the State was not
an abutting landowner who paid taxes and thus was appeared on the rolls of the Tooele
County Assessor, as the statute required. Therefore, the county had complied with
section 27-12-102.4, and Ordinance 93-9 was not invalid. (R. 347; R. 355 at 42;
Addendum A). Summary judgment was granted to defendants (R. 345-48), and this
appeal by the State of Utah ensued (R. 352-53).

9

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
At the request of some private landowners, Tooele County passed an ordinance
vacating the northern end of a public road on Stansbury Island that had provided public
access to Utah sovereign lands there. The county had not mailed to all record owners of
land abutting the vacated end of the road, including the State of Utah, notice of the
proposed action or of the public hearing ostensibly held to consider whether it would be
detrimental to the public interest.
The trial court concluded the county had complied with the mandate in former
section 27-12-102.4 for giving prior notice by merely publishing notice of the proposal in
the Tooele Transcript-Bulletin. Alternatively, the court concluded the statute required
mailed notice only to owners of record of abutting land who are taxpayers. Both
interpretations of the statute are erroneous.
The plain language of section 27-12-102.4, the same as that in current section 108-8.4, requires that notice of a proposal to vacate a public road be mailed to abutting
landowners, whether public notice is otherwise made by publication or by posting. This
is consistent with the statute's purpose, with current law, with sound public policy, and
with Tolman v. Salt Lake County, 437 P.2d 442,448 (Utah 1968). In Tolman, this Court
held that only posting notice of a proposed government action affecting propertyrightsof
nearby landowners was constitutionally inadequate.
In addition, there is no basis for concluding the legislature intended notice of the

10

proposal to be mailed just to abutting property owners who also pay property taxes. This
construction thwarts the statute's purpose-to give prior notice of the possible
governmental action to all owners of record of land abutting the public road and afford
them an opportunity to be heard before the road is closed to public travel. Because many
private and governmental entities besides the State of Utah are likewise exempted from
paying property taxes, the trial court's construction also leads to results that are absurd
and constitutionally suspect under Tolman.
Correctly interpreted, former section 27-12-102.4 required the county to mail
notice to all abutting landowners, tax exempt or not, in addition to either publishing or
posting notice of the proposal to vacate the north end of the West Stansbury Road.
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the summary judgment granted defendants.
ARGUMENT
I. WHETHER NOTICE WAS ALSO PUBLISHED OR POSTED,
SECTION 27-12-102.4 REQUIRED THE COUNTY TO MAIL
WRITTEN NOTICE TO ABUTTING LANDOWNERS OF THE
PETITION TO VACATE THE PUBLIC ROAD AND OF THE
HEARING ON THE PETITION
A.

The plain language of section 27-12-102.4. as punctuated, requires mailed notice
to abutting landowners in addition to notice bv publication.
As this Court has held, strict compliance with the notice procedures in section 27-

12-102.4 is required before a public road can be properly vacated by a county.
Henderson v. Osguthorpe, 657 P.2d 1268, 1270 (Utah 1982); Ercanbrack v. Judd, 524
P.2d 595, 597 (Utah 1974).
11

The first issue in this appeal is whether section 27-12-102.4 required Tooele
County to mail notice of the petition and public hearing to abutting landowners even
though it published such notice in the Tooele Transcript-Bulletin. The relevant part of
this statutory section, with emphasis added, required the County to give notice
by publishing in a newspaper published or of general circulation in such
county once a week for four consecutive weeks preceding action on such
petition or intention, or, where no newspaper is published in the county by
posting the notice in three public places therein for four consecutive weeks
preceding such petition, and by mailing such notice to all owners of record
of land abutting the county road proposed to be vacated addressed to the
mailing addresses appearing on the rolls of the county assessor of the
county wherein said land is located
The controversy involves the meaning of "by publishing . . . , o r , . . . by posting . . . , and
by mailing

" Defendants contended, and Judge Young agreed, that this language

requires notice be given (a) by publishing or (b) by posting and mailing to abutting
landowners. Because the notice in this case was properly published, they reasoned, no
notice had to be mailed to landowners abutting the West Stansbury Road. (R. 280-83;
292, 294, 333, 338; R. 355 at 26-27) This interpretation of the statute is erroneous.
In construing a statute, a court looks first to its plain language. State v. Redd, 1999
UT 108, f 11; Stephens v. Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1997). The
primary goal of the interpreting court is to give effect to the legislative intent, evidenced
by its plain language viewed in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve.
State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, H 25,4 P.3d 795, 799-800; see Nelson v. Salt Lake County,
905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995). In addition to the duty to effectuate legislative intent,
12

reviewing courts have the obligation, whenever possible, to construe statutes to avoid
constitutional infirmities. In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, f 23, lP.3d 1073; In
re L.G. W.,64\ P.2d 127, 131 (Utah 1982). Moreover, a court must interpret a statute in a
manner
that reflects sound public policy, as we presume that must be what the
legislature intended. See Schurz v. BMW of North America, Inc., 814 P.2d
1108, 1113 (Utah 1991). In other words, we interpret a statute to avoid
absurd consequences. See Clover v Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037,
1045 n.39 (Utah 1991); see also Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282,
1292 n.24 (Utah 1993).
Redd, 1999 UT 108, f 12.
In addition, far from being a "hypertechnical" consideration, as defendants argued
below (R. 288), the punctuation of section 27-12-102.4 informs the interpretive process
and may be resorted to as an aid in ascertaining the legislative intent. See Board ofEduc.
v. Hanchett, 167 P. 686, 687 (Utah 1917). In such a case, "courts may not, and do not,
arbitrarily ignore punctuation, but will give it due consideration and effect." Id.
Here, the statute's punctuation ("by publishing . . . , o r , . . . by posting . . . , and by
mailing . . . . " ) supports an interpretation of section 27-12-102.4 that requires notice be
mailed to abutting landowners, whether the general public is notified via publication or
posting. To indicate this, the drafters used a comma to separate the mailing requirement
from the publishing or posting requirement instead of using punctuation (or its absence)
to link mailing only with posting. Cf Kimball Condos. Owners Ass 'n v. County Bd.
Equal., 943 P.2d 642, 646 (Utah 1997) (concluding legislature, using punctuation
13

advisedly, inserted commas to set one clause apart from the remainder of the statutory
provision). The drafters' use of a comma before the last clause (", and by mailing...") in
section 27-12-102.4 suggests that the mailing requirement applies to the previous two
situations in the series, i.e., publication and posting. If they had intended mailing to be
linked only with posting, they could have foregone the comma just before "and by
mailing." Cf Elliot Coal Mining v. Director, Office of Workers Comp., 17 F.3d 616, 630
(3rd Cir. 1994).
Section 27-12-102.4, enacted in 1963, was patterned after Utah Code Ann. § 10-88.4 (1999), a 1955 enactment-still in effect- that specifies the manner in which notice
must be given when a city is considering a proposal to vacate a city street or alley. It, too,
requires notice of the petition and hearing
be given by publishing in a newspaper..., o r , . . . by posting..., and by
mailing such notice to all owners of record of land abutting the street or
alley proposed to be vacated addressed to the mailing addresses appearing
on the rolls of the county assessor of the county wherein such land is
located....
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-8.4 (1999) (emphasis added). In Nelson v. Provo City, 872 P.2d
35, 38 (Utah App. 1994), the court interpreted this language-the same as that in former
section 27-12-102.4-as requiring publication and mailed notice to the abutting
landowners. Because the city did not comply with this requirement, the purported
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vacation of a roadway was declared a nullity. Id.5
Here, a fair reading of section 27-12-102.4 in light of its purpose is likewise that
the legislature intended notice of a proposal to vacate a public road be given (a) by
publication or by posting and, in either case, (b) by mailing notice to abutting
landowners. This interpretation is consistent with the statute's purpose. Notice of the
petition and hearing is important so that interested parties can attend and present the
county commissioners with some informed basis for deciding whether there is "good
cause" to vacate the public road and whether doing so would be "detrimental to the
general interest" under Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-102.1 (Supp. 1993). The legislature
could not have thought that the input necessary under section 27-12-102.1 would reach
the county commissioners if the only notice given was notice to the general public in a
local newspaper. Abutting landowners are the persons most likely to know about the
need for the public road and to care the most about whether the road to their property
remains a county road, traveled freely by the general public and maintained by the county.
It is illogical to conclude that the legislature intended known abutting landowners
to get individual mailed notices of the petition and hearing only in conjunction with
posting, and not with publication. Neither posting nor publication alone is likely to give

5

This result is consistent with Tolman v. Salt Lake County, 437 P.2d 442 (Utah
1968), in which this Court held that the county violated due process by only posting
public notices of a proposed zoning variance that affected the property rights of
neighboring landowners. Tolman is discussed, infra, at 17.
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actual notice to individual abutting landowners of a pending proposal to close a public
road, as is mailed notice. Indeed, the legislature's recognition of the primacy of notice to
abutting landowners over notice to the general public is reflected in nearby section 27-12102.3, which does away with notice to the general public entirely if all the abutting
owners give written consent to vacating of the public road.
It is contrary to the statute's purpose to interpret section 27-12-102.4 as not
requiring mailed notice of a petition to vacate to those most interested in the proposed
action to be taken by the county. Under this interpretation, urged by defendants and
adopted by the trial court, a county could vacate a public road by merely publishing notice
and never mailing individual notice to the abutting landowners who actually live on and
use the public road. The statute should not be interpreted in a manner that attributes such
an untenable intent to the legislature and leads to such an absurd result.
More importantly, interpreting the statute to allow publication of notice, without
accompanying written notice to abutting landowners, would render the statute vulnerable
to constitutional challenge. To the extent abutting landowners have property interests
affected by a proposal to vacate a public road, due process entitles them to adequate
notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See Dairy Product Servs. v. City of
Wellsville, 2000 UT 81, % 48; Anderson v. Utah County Bd. ofCommr's, 589 P.2d 1214,
1216 (Utah 1979).
Adequate notice is "notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to

16

apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections." Tolman v. Salt Lake County, 437 P.2d 442, 448 (Utah 1968)
(quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950));
accord Provo River Water Users' Ass 'n v. Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 934 (Utah 1993). In
Tolman, this Court held constitutionally and statutorily invalid notice of a proposed
zoning variance hearing that was required by the relevant statute only to be published in a
newspaper and posted in three public places. 437 P.2d at 447-48. This was so because
the notice given did not reasonably apprise neighboring landowners of the proposed
zoning change, as due process requires. Id.
Here, construing section 27-12-102.4 to permit the county to vacate West
Stansbury Road after only notice by publication would result in a similar constitutional
infirmity. By itself, publication in the Tooele Transcript-Bulletin would not be
reasonably calculated to inform abutting landowners of the proposal to vacate the public
road and of the hearing thereon. To avoid this, the plain language of the statute should
instead be interpreted as requiring mailed notice to abutting landowners in addition to
notice by publication.
B. Even if the meaning of Section 27-12-102.4 is ambiguous about whether mailed
notice to abutting landowners must accompany notice by publication, legislative
history supports the view that it must.
Defendants alternatively argued below that it is not clear from section 27-12-102.4
whether mailed notice must be given in conjunction with published notice. Accordingly,
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they directed the trial court to "legislative history" as an interpretive aid. See Vigos v.
Mountainland Builders.Jnc, 2000 UT 2, % 13, 993 P.2d 207 (concluding a court may
look beyond its plain language to legislative history if the meaning of a statute is
ambiguous); World Peace Mvmt v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 257-58
(Utah 1996) (same).
For this purpose, defendants relied solely on the 1998 recodification of the statutes
related to counties' vacating of public roads. (R. 290-92). That year, the legislature
passed 1998 Utah Laws, ch. 270, § 77, which restructured and moved the bulk of former
section 27-12-102.4 into new section 72-3-108, effective March 21,1998. The new
section required that notice be
(a) published in a newspaper...; or
(b) posted... and . . . mailed to all owners of property abutting the county
road.
Utah Code Ann. § 72-3-108(2) (Supp. 1999) (amended 2000). See Addendum B.
The parties agreed below that the legislative history of the 1998 rewrite and
recodification showed it was not intended to make substantive changes in the law
governing the vacation of public roads. (R. 100-01,291). The sponsor of the
Transportation Code Recodification Bill reassured other representatives during the House
floor debate, "There is nothing substantive of any kind new in this. It is a recodification .
. . . That's why you're seeing the underline, because verbiage has actually been reworded
to consolidate what in fact is already in existing law. " Remarks of Rep. Marda Dillree,
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Gen'l Session, 52nd Utah Leg., Jan. 22, 1998, tape 1, counter nos. 1575, 1630.
Because the 1998 version of section 72-3-108 did apparently require the county to
provide mailed notice to abutting landowners only along with posting, and not along with
publication, defendants argued that the legislature, seeing it as no change from former
law, must have intended the same notice process in the former statute, too. In response,
the State contended that the 1998 rewriters mistakenly changed the notice process
substantively, contrary to what the Utah Legislature intended. (R. 100-01, 291).
As this Court has recognized, "[l]ater versions of a statute do not necessarily reveal
the intent behind an earlier version." Visitor Info. Center v. Customer Serv. Div., 930
P.2d 1196, 1198 (Utah 1997). This warning is particularly apt in the instant case, where
the 1998 version of section 72-3-108 did not accurately reflect legislative intent. The
State's position on this point was vindicated by the Utah Legislature's amendment of
section 72-3-108(2) in 2000 Utah Laws, ch. 324, § 5, effective March 16,2000, to
provide:
(2) A county may not vacate a county road unless notice of the hearing is:
(a) published in a newspaper...; or
(b) posted...; and
(c) mailed to . . . all owners of property abutting the county road.
Utah Code Ann. §72-3-108(2) (Supp. 2000). See Addendum B. The 2000 Utah
Legislature corrected the error in the earlier version of section 72-3-108(2) to once again
require notice to be mailed to abutting landowners, whether notice is otherwise provided
by publication or by posting. To the extent that the later enactment sheds any light on the
19

meaning of former section 27-12-102.4, the law in effect in 1993 when Tooele County
adopted Ordinance 93-9, it supports the interpretation urged by the State in the trial court
and here on appeal.
This Court should hold that former section 27-12-102.4 required notice of the
petition and hearing to be mailed to abutting property owners even if notice was
otherwise provided through publication and that the trial court erred in concluding
otherwise.
II. SECTION 27-12-102.4 REQUIRED THE COUNTY TO MAIL
NOTICE OF THE PETITION AND HEARING TO ALL ABUTTING
LANDOWNERS, NOT JUST TO THOSE WHO PAY PROPERTY
TAXES
Even if the statute required mailed notice in addition to notice by publication,
defendants successfully argued below, it required that notice be mailed only to abutting
landowners who pay property taxes and, thus, have a mailing address on the rolls of the
county assessor. (R. 347).
Former section 27-12-102.4 states that notice is given
by mailing such notice to all owners of record of land abutting the county
road proposed to be vacated addressed to the mailing address appearing
on the rolls of the county assessor of the county wherein said land is
located [.]
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-102.4 (Supp. 1993) (emphasis added). Defendants provided the
trial court with affidavits from Tooele County's Assessor and Recorder stating that the
Tooele County's assessor rolls do not show the State as an owner of property on
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Stansbury Island with a mailing address (R.l 13-14, included as Addendum F). However,
the affiants offered no explanation for this omission in the rolls pertaining to the
sovereign lands around Stansbury Island, which may result from mistakes or neglect of
official duty. See Utah Code Ann. § 17-21-22 (1999 ) (county recorder to annually
prepare ownership plats showing "record owners" on January 1 and transmit to assessor);
Utah Code Ann. § 17-21-22 (1999 ) (ownership plats to show "record owners of each
tract of land in the county"); Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-303 (1996) (assessor shall become
fully acquainted with all property in his county); cf. Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-102.4
(repealed 1998) (requiring notice by mail "to all owners of record of land abutting the
county road").
Instead, the county's lawyer explained the omission by tendering this interpretation
of the statutory language emphasized above: "How do you get on the county assessor's
rolls? You pay taxes. The State doesn't pay taxes. They don't show up on the rolls.
That's what our Affidavit of the County Assessor said to the Court. That's why the State
wasn't mailed notice." (R. 355 at 19). Counsel for the Bleazards concurred in this
reading of section 27-12-102.4, adding that the State "didn't care" about being notified-it
had no need for, or interest in, notice of a proposal to the county to vacate a county road
because in the statutes the State had already delegated that power to the county. (R. 355
at 20-22; see also R. 337; 355 at 32-33). Moreover, although the defendants'
memorandum informed the trial court that "[b]y law the rolls of the county assessor are
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intended to list private property owners who are legally obligated to pay the property
taxes" (R. 284), they provided no legal authority for this proposition. Nonetheless, Judge
Young gave the statute the construction defendants requested.6
This Court have given the following counsel about the proper construction of a
statute's plain language in cases such as the instant one:
Where we are faced with two alternative readings, and we have no reliable
sources that clearly fix the legislative purpose, we look to the consequences
of those readings to determine the meaning to be given the statute. Our
clear preference is the reading that reflects sound public policy, as we
presume that must be what the legislature intended.
Redd, 1999 UT 108, f 12.
This Court should reject the trial court's implausible interpretation of section 2712-102.4 for several reasons. First, it violates a principle of statutory construction
because it contradicts the purpose of the statute, particularly sections 27-12-102.1 through
-102.4, which is to alert abutting landowners to a proposed road closure that will affect
their property interests. See Burns, 2000 UT 56, f 25,4 P.3d at 799-800; see also Nelson,

6

Judge Young may have been misled by the cryptic affidavits and by counsels'
expansive remarks into thinking that all property owned by the State of Utah in Tooele
County is not listed as such on the assessor's rolls, which, therefore, do not show the
State's mailing address. As printouts from the Tooele County Tax Assessor's
computerized rolls show, see Addendum G, the State owns numerous properties there,
and the fact of its ownership and its mailing addresses are listed for the properties.
These readily ascertainable matters of public record should be, and can be, judicially
noticed on appeal. See McGarry v. Thompson, 201 P.2d 288, 291 (Utah 1948) (Court
takes judicial notice of fact shown by public record, the state engineer's, not introduced
below); State Board of Lands Commr's v. Ririe, 190 P. 59, 60 (Utah 1920) (same, for
public records kept by Auditor and State Lands Board); see also Utah R. Evid. 201.
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905 P.2d at 875. It is the interest as property owners on a public road that the legislature
clearly sought to protect in section 27-12-102.4 (and in the current law, section 72-3-108),
with no differentiation made between different types of owners for notice purposes. As a
landowner, the State is equally as affected as other landowners by any proposal to vacate
the public roads its lands abut. The legislative disinterest concocted by the Bleazards'
attorneys out of whole cloth ignores the distinction between the State's interest as the
main operator of the state highway system and the State's interest as the sovereign owner
of public lands held in trust for all Utahns.
Second, if the legislature meant to exclude all non-taxpaying landownersfromthe
notice requirements it could have easily done so by simply inserting the adjective
"taxpaying" before the terms "owners of record" in section 27-12-102.4 (as well as in
section 10-8-8.4, the notice provision currently applicable to a proposal to vacate a city
street or alley). Since the legislature did not do so, it is reasonable to assume it intended,
for notice purposes, to provide mailed notice to all abutting landowners, regardless of taxexempt status.
Third, the trial court's construction of the statute appears to be based on an
erroneous understanding of which landowners the law requires be shown on the rolls of
the assessor. Despite counsel's representation, the State is aware of no law stating that
the assessor's rolls only list the names and addresses of landowners who are also
taxpayers. On the contrary, section 17-21-22 requires the county recorder to annually
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prepare documents showing record owners of property and to pass it on to the assessor,
who is mandated by section 59-2-303 to be fully acquainted with all property in his
county, not just taxable property. Moreover, as the public records in Addendum G
demonstrate, the Tooele County Assessor's rolls do list the State of Utah-despite its taxexempt status-as owner of record for numerous other properties in the county and do
show its mailing addresses.
Fourth, the construction adopted below leads to absurd results contrary to sound
public policy, in violation of basic principles of statutory construction. See Redd, 1999
UT 108, f 12; Clover, 808 P.2d at 1045 n.39. Under Utah law, the State's property is
exempt from property taxes, Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1103(1) (1996), as is land owned by
many other governmental and nongovernmental entities or individuals. For example,
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1101(2)(d) (Supp. 2000) exempts federally-exempted land and
property of nonprofit entities devoted to public, religious or charitable purposes. It also
exempts property owned by the state, school districts, public libraries, and all other
political subdivisions of the State. Accord Utah Const, art. XIII, § 2; see also Utah Code
Ann. § 53A-3-408 (2000) (exempting property of local school boards); id. § 53B-20-106
(2000) (same for higher education institutions); id. §§ 59-2-1104, -1105 (Supp. 2000)
(exempting up to $82,500 of property of disabled veterans and their survivors).
Under the trial court's construction, the words "addressed to the mailing address
appearing on the rolls of the county assessor" in former section 27-12-102.4 (and in
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current section 10-8-8.4) is a substantive description limiting abutting landowners to +
those who are also taxpayers. Only the delimited subclass of taxpaying/abutting
landowners is entitled to written notice of a proposal to vacate a public road. Thus, State
Street between 400 and 500 South in Salt Lake City, where tax-exempt governments own
land under the Matheson Courthouse and the City-County Building, could be closed
without any individual written notice to the State, the city, or the county. North Temple
in Salt Lake City could be vacated without any notice to the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints, and the eastern dead end of North Medical Drive in Salt Lake City
could be cut off without notifying the Jewish Community Center at Fort Douglas, the
Children's Center, the University of Utah, the Moran Eye Institute, University Hospital,
or Primary Children's Hospital-all abutting landowners exemptfrompaying property
taxes. This Court should reject a construction of the language in former section 27-12-12.4 (and current section 10-8-8.4) that attributes such a peculiar motive to the legislature
and leads to such absurd results.
Finally, the construction adopted by the trial should be rejected because it may
render the statute unconstitutional. See In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, f 23;
In re L.G.W., 641 P.2d at 131. To the extent abutting landowners' property interests will
be affected by governmental abandonment of a public road, all of them-not just the ones
who also must pay property taxes on their land-are entitled under the due process clause
to adequate notice and opportunity to be heard. See Dairy Product Servs., 2000 UT 81,
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K 48; Anderson, 589 P.2d at 1216; Tolman, 437 P.2d at 448.7
This Court should hold that former section 27-12-102.4, correctly construed,
required notice to be mailed "to all owners of record of land abutting the county road
proposed to be vacated," regardless of whether the owner is property tax exempt.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State of Utah asks the Court to reverse the summary
judgment awarded defendants and remand this case to the district court for further
proceedings.
Respectfully submitted this 2*J£ day of November, 2000.

ANNINA M. MITCHELL (#2274)
Deputy Utah Solicitor General
STEPHEN G. BOYDEN (#0410)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellant

7

The State of Utah is entitled, as an abutting landowner, to whatever statutory due
process was given by section 27-12-102.4 to all other abutting landowners. See United
States v. Cardinal Mine Supply, Inc., 916 F.2d 1087, 1091 (6th Cir. 1990); In re Vaughn,
151 B.R. 87 (Texas 1993); see also City ofAlbuquerque v. Chavez, 941 P.2d 509, 513
(N.M. App. 1997).
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Addendum A

George S. Young (#3589)
Brent A. Bohman (#4275)
PRUITT, GUSHEE & BACHTELL
1850 Beneficial Life Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)531-8446
Facsimile: (801)531-8468
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH, by and through the
DIVISION OF FORESTRY, FIRE &
STATE LANDS,
Plaintiffs,
v.
TOOELE COUNTY, Utah, SDC MILE
RANCH COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
CRAIG S. BLEAZARD, an individual,
MARK C. BLEAZARD, an individual,
JOHN D. BLEAZARD, an individual, and
the AMERICAN OH- COMPANY, a
Maryland corporation,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)
)
)
) Case No.: 990300437
)
) Judge David S. Young
)
)

The State of Utah's, by and through the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands
(the "Division"), Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants Six Mile Ranch
Company, Mark Bleazard, Craig Bleazard and John BleazardY Cross Motion for Summary
Judgment having been heard by the court on April 12, 2000, Brent A. Bohman and George

S. Young of Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell having appeared on behalf of the above referenced
Defendants, Douglas Ahlstrom having appeared on behalf of Defendant Tooele County and
Stephen Boyden having appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff State of Utah, the court having
reviewed the pertinent pleadings of record and having heard the arguments of counsel,
hereby concludes, orders and decrees as follows:
1.

With regard to the Division's claim that the Ordinance vacating the subject
road is invalid because Tooele County failed to provide written notice to the
abutting landowners, the court concludes as a matter of law that:
a.

Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-102.4 did not require that written notice be
provided to the abutting landowners when notice by publication has
been made and, in any event, the Division was not a party to whom
such written notice would have been required to be provided because
it was not an abutting property owner on the rolls of the Tooele
County Assessor as specified therein;

b.

Furthermore, the Division lacks standing to assert the lack of any
such written notice to the abutting landowners entitled to such notice;
and

c.

In any event, even assuming the Division had such standing, all of
those abutting landowners not only had actual notice of and the
opportunity to be heard on the merits of the Petition to Vacate but, in
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fact, were either heard on the merits and/or waived any right to be
heard.
2.

With regard to the Division's claim that the Ordinance vacating the subject
road is invalid because it was not in the public interest to do so, the court
finds that the State of Utah delegated to the Tooele County Commission the
exclusive legislative authority to determine whether or not it was in the
public interest to vacate the road, and there being no evidence presented that
said determination constituted a manifest abuse of discretion or was the result
of fraud, said claim therefore constitutes an impermissible collateral on the
legislative discretion of Tooele County.

3.

With regard to the Division's claim that the Ordinance vacating the subject
road is invalid because it violates the Public Trust Doctrine, the court finds
that said doctrine is inapplicable to an ordinance vacating a road that is
located on private property and, in any event, the Public Trust Doctrine does
not vitiate a governmental authority to vacate a public road when it has been
determined that it is in the public interest to do so.

4.

With regard to the Division's final claim that the Ordinance vacating the
subject road merely caused said road to revert to the State of Utah, the court
finds that Tooele County had the legal authority to vacate whatever public
interest may have existed in die road, if any, regardless as to whether the
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road was a public road by "dedication" or an R.S. 2477 right-of-way, but, in
any event, there being no genuine issues of material fact, the court finds as a
matter of law that the subject road was not an R.S. 2477 right-of-way.
Based on the foregoing conclusions of law, the Division's Motion for Summary
Judgment is hereby denied and Defendants' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment is
hereby granted. In addition, because each of Defendants' counterclaims are dependent on
the Division having been able to set aside the Ordinance and thereby reach the merits of its
quiet title claim, said counterclaims are hereby dismissed without prejudice.

Tooele County

Stephen G. Boyden /
Asst. Attorney General

Addendum B

HIGHWAY CODE

27-12-102.1

27-12-101. Title to property acquired by state.
(1) Title to real property acquired by the department or the counties, cities,
^ d towns by gift, agreement, exchange, purchase, condemnation, or otherwise for highway rights-of-way or other highway purposes may be in fee
simple or any lesser estate or interest.
(2) A transfer of land bounded by a highway on a right-of-way for which the
public has only an easement passes the title of the person whose estate is
transferred to the middle of the highway.
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, } 101; 1901, ch.
j$7, § 29.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend^eiit, effective April 29, 1991, subdivided the
jection; substituted "department1' for "state

road commission" in Subsection (1); deleted
"public" before "highway" near the beginning
of Subjection (2); and made changes in punctuation and phraseology,

27-12-10& Abandonment of easement or vacation of highway.
(1) (a) The commission shall abandon any easement or vacate any highway
by resolution.
(b) A certified copy of the resolution may be recorded without acknowledgment, certification of acknowledgment, or further proof in the office of
the county recorder of each county in which any portion of the easement
to be abandoned or the highway to be vacated lies.
(c) A fee may not be charged for recordation. On recordation, the abandonment or vacation is complete.
(2) (a) When a highway for which the state holds only an easement is
vacated or abandoned or when any other easement is abandoned, the land
previously subject to the easement isfreefromthe public easement for
highway purposes.
(b) If the state owns infoethe land in which the vacated highway was
located, the department may sell, exchange, or otherwise dispose of the
land in the manner provided by law.
(3) In any proceeding for the abandonment or vacation of any state highway or part of a state highway, the department may reserve any easements,
rights, or interests in the highway found desirable and in the best interest of
the state.
History* L» I N * c k 3$\ I 10* 1901, eh.
1ST, I m
AasssMtaMMst N e t s * — Hie 1901 amsosV
meat, sfltctoe April 2t\ 1901, subdivides] the

section; substituted "departmsnt^ for "ammiasum* in Subsections (2Kb) and (3); and mads
changes in punctuation and phraseology,

27-12-102.1. Vacation, narrowing or change of name of
county road — Petition by property owner.
On petition by a person owning property within the county praying that a
county road abutting such piuperty be vacated, narrowed, or the name thereof
changed, the county legislative body of such county, upon hearing and upon
being satisfied that there is good cause for such change of name, vacation or
narrowing, that it will not be detrimental to the general interest, and that it
should be made, may declare by ordinance such county road vacated, nar201

5m°p. \<\<\j>

27-12-102.2

HIGHWAYS

rowed or the name thereof changed. The county legislative body may ln .
in one ordinance the change of name, or the vacation, or the narrow^ ^
more than one county road.
^f
History: C. 1953, 27-12-102.1, enacted by
L. 1965, ch. 52, § 1; 1993, ch. 227, § 302.
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993, substituted

"county legislative body" for "board of
commissioners" or for "county c o m m i t
0,
throughout.
»*

27-12-102.2. Vacation, narrowing or change of name of
county road — Action by county legislative bo<}v
without petition.
When there are two or more county roads of the same name in the countv
the county legislative body by ordinance and without petition thereof, mL
change the name of any such county road, so as to leave only one to L
designated by the original name. When in the opinion of the county legislative
body of the county there is good cause for vacating, or narrowing a county
road, or any part thereof, and that such vacation or narrowing will not 1^
detrimental to the general interest, it may, by ordinance, and without petition
therefor, vacate or narrow such county road or any part thereof.
History: C. 1953, 27-12-102.2, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 52, } 2; 1993, ch. 227, S 303.
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend-

ment, effective May 3, 1993, substitute
"county legislative body" for "board of county
commissioners" throughout.

27-12-102.3. Vacation — Notice — Exception.
Notice of the intention of the county legislative body to vacate any county
road, or part thereof, shall in all cases be given as provided in Section
27-12-102.4, except when there is filed with the county legislative body written consent to such vacation by the owners of the property abutting the part of
the county road proposed to be vacated, in which case such notice shall not be
required.
History: C. 1953, 27-12-UHLS, enacted by
L. 1965, ch. 52, f 3; 1992, ch. 30, t 59; 1993,
ch. 227, § 304.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 1992, substituted

"Section 27-12-102.4" for "the next section'
The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993
twice substituted "county legislative body" for
"board of county commissioners."

27-12-102.4. Vacation — Publication and posting or mailing of notice.
No county road shall be so vacated, unless notice of the pendency of the
petition and prayer thereof, and the date of the hearing thereon, if such petition isfiled,or of the intention of the county legislative body of the county to
vacate, and the date of the hearing on such question if no petition is filed, be
given by publishing in a newspaper published or of general circulation in such
county once a week for four consecutive weeks preceding action on such petition or intention, or, where no newspaper is published in the county by posting the notice in three public places therein for four consecutive weeks preceding such petition, and by mailing such notice to all owners of record of land
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putting the county road proposed to be vacated addressed to the mailing
presses appearing on the rolls of the county assessor of the county wherein
' d land is located. Action thereon shall take place within three months after
he completion of notice.
history: C. 1953, 27-12-102.4, enacted by
, 1965, ch. 52, § 4; 1993, ch. 227, § 305.
^^ynendment Notes. — The 1993 amend-

ment, effective May 3, 1993, substituted
"county legislative body" for "board of county
commissioners" near the beginning.

27-12-102.5. Vacation or narrowing of county road — Effect of action of county legislative body.
The action of the county legislative body vacating or narrowing a county
^ad which has been dedicated to public use by the proprietor, shall operate to
^e extent to which it is vacated or narrowed, upon the effective date of the
vacating ordinance, as a revocation of the acceptance thereof, and the relinquishment of the county's fees therein by the county legislative body, but the
fight of way and easements therein, if any, of the property owner and the
franchise rights of any public utility shall not be impaired thereby.
History: C. 1953, 27-12-102.5, enacted by
I. 1965, ch. 52, § 5; 1993, ch. 227, I 306.
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend*

ment, effective May 3, 1993, substituted
"county legislative body" for "board of county
commissioners" in two places.

27-12-103. Acquisition of property devoted to or held for
other public use.
(1) If property devoted to or held for some other public use for which the
power of eminent domain might be exercised is to be taken for state highway
purposes, the department may, with the consent of the person or agency in
charge of the other public use, condemn real property to be exchanged with
the person or agency for the real property to be taken for state highway
purposes.
(2) This section does not limit the department's authorization to acquire,
other than by condemnation, property for exchange purposes.
History: L. 1903, ch. 39, § 103; 1991, ch.
137, $ 31.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, subdivided the
section; substituted "department" for "commis-

sion" in Subsection (1); substituted "department's authorization0 for "authorization to the
commission" in Subsection (2); and made
changes in phraseology,

27-12-103.2. Purpose statement
The Legislature recognizes that highways provide tangible benefits to private and public lands of the state by providing access, allowing development,
and facilitating production of income. Many of those highways traverse state
lands, including lands held by the state in trust for the school children and
public institutions of the state. Many of the existing highways have been
previously established without an official grant of an easement or right of
entry from this state, yet these highways often are the only access to private
and public lands of the state. The Legislature intends to establish a means for
ensuring continued access to the private and public lands of the state for the
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
Notice*
Class D road maps on file with the a county
ierk's office pursuant to this section did not

impart constructive notice of their contents.
First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. Ranch, Inc., 966
P.2d 834 (Utah 1998).

72-3-108. County roads — Vacation and narrowing.
(1) A county may, by ordinance, vacate, narrow, or change the name of a
county road without petition or after petition by a property owner.
(2) A county may not vacate a county road unless notice of the hearing is:
(a) published in a newspaper of general circulation in the county once a
week for four consecutive weeks prior to the hearing; or
(b) posted in three public places for four consecutive weeks prior to the
hearing and is mailed to all owners of property abutting the county road.
(3) The right-of-way and easements, if any, of a property owner and the
franchise rights of any public utility may not be impaired by vacating or
narrowing a county road.
History: C. 1953, 72-3-108, enacted by L.
1998, ch. 270, § 77.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1998, ch. 270, §
355 makes the act effective on March 21, 1998.

72-3-109. Division of responsibility with respect to state
highways in cities and towns.
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), the jurisdiction and responsibility
of the department and the municipalities for state highways within municipalities is as follows:
(a) The department has jurisdiction over and is responsible for the
construction and maintenance of:
(i) the portion of the state highway located between the back of the
curb on either side of the state highway; or
(ii) if there is no curb, the traveled way, its contiguous shoulders,
and appurtenances.
(b) The department may widen or improve state highways within
municipalities.
(c) (i) A municipality has jurisdiction over all other portions of the
right-of-way and is responsible for construction and maintenance of
the right-of-way.
(ii) If a municipality grants permission for the installation of any
pole, pipeline, conduit, sewer, ditch, culvert, billboard, advertising
sign, or any other structure or object of any kind or character within
the portion of the right-of-way under its jurisdiction:
(A) the permission shall contain the condition that any installation will be removed from the right-of-way at the request of the
municipality; and
(B) the municipality shall cause any installation to be removed
at the request of the department when the department finds the
removal necessary:
(I) to eliminate a hazard to traffic safety;
(ID for the construction and maintenance of the state
highway; or
(III) to meet the requirements of federal regulations.
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History: C. 1953, 27-15-3, enacted by L.
1978, ch. 9, 9 3; 1978 (2nd S.S.), ch. 2, § 1;
renumbered by L. 1998, ch. 270, § 74; 2000,
ch. 324, § 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amendment, effective March 21, 1998, renumbered
this section, which formerly appeared as §
27-15-3, divided the section, designating the
subsections, and added Subsections (1) and (2);
substituted "class D roads* for 'roads" and made
similar and related changes throughout the

72-3-108

section, and made numerous stylistic changes
throughout the section.
The 2000 amendment, effective March 16,
2000, in Subsection (1) substituted "has been*
for "is" and deleted "reasonably passable" before "for usage", added Subsections (3) and (4),
redesignating subsections accordingly; deleted
the former last sentence in Subsection (5),
which read: "A county shall be given a minimum of two years to complete mapping of the
class D roads within its boundaries", and made
stylistic changes.

72-3-106. Actions to determine priority of use of public
roads.
(1) The county attorney under the direction of the county legislative body
shall determine a priority of public use of all county roads.
(2) This action may be instigated by the written request often taxpayers of
the county to the county legislative body.
(3) The county legislative body shall request the county attorney to instigate
action within a reasonable length of time.
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 24; 1998, ch.
227, * 296, 27-12-24; renumbered by L.
1996, ch. 270, § 75.
Amendment Notes* — The 1998 amendment, effective March 21, 1998, renumbered
this section^ which formerly appeared aa § 2712-24; designated the formerly undesignated
subsections; in Subsection (1), substituted "use

of all county roads" for "use of all highways,
roads, streets, paths and ways not otherwise
designated as a federal highway, state highway,
county road, city street, or special highway*
and made stylistic changes; and in Subsection
(2), made a stylistic change and deleted "in the
county in which the undesignated way is situated" at the end.

72-3-107. County executive to keep plats of roads and
highways.
(1) The county executive of each county shall determine all county roads
existing in the county and prepare and keep current plats and specific
descriptions of the county roads.
(2) The plats and specific descriptions shall be kept onfilein the office of the
county clerk or recorder.
History: L. 1968, ch. 36, § 26; 1988, ch.
227, 5 300, 27.12-2* renumbered by L.
1996, ch. 270, | 76.
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amendment, effective March 21, 1996, renumbered
this section, which formerly appeared as $ 2712-26; designated the formerly undesignated

subsections; in Subsection (1) substituted
"county roads" for "same and of such other
highways as he may from time to time locate
upon public lands, which" at the end, and made
stylistic changes; and m Subsection (2) added
"The plats and specific descriptions'' at the
beginning.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Note*
Class D road maps on file with the a county
clerk's office pursuant to this section did not

impart constructive notice of their contents.
First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. Ranch, Inc., 966
P.2d 834 (Utah 1998).

72-3-108. County roads — Vacation and narrowing.
(1) A county may, by ordinance, vacate, narrow, or change the name of a
county road without petition or after petition by a property owner.

72-3-109
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(2) A county may not vacate a county road unless notice of the hearing is:
(a) published in a newspaper of general circulation in the county once a
week for four consecutive weeks prior to the hearing; or
(b) posted in three public places for four consecutive weeks prior to the
hearing; and
(c) mailed to the department and all owners of property abutting the
county road.
(3) The right-of-way and easements, if any, of a property owner and the
franchise rights of any public utility may not be impaired by vacating or
narrowing a county road.
(4) Except as provided in Section 72-5-305, if a county vacates a county road,
the state's right-of-way interest in the county road is also vacated.
History: C. 1953, 72-3-108, enacted by L.
1998, ch. 270, § 77; 2000, ch. 324, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 2000 amendment, effective March 16, 2000, added Mthe

department and" in Subsection (2)(c), added
Subsection (4), and made a stylistic change.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1998, ch. 270, §
355 makes the act effective on March 21, 1998.

72-3-109. Division of responsibility with respect to state
highways in cities and towns.
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), the jurisdiction and responsibility
of the department and the municipalities for state highways within municipalities is as follows:
(a) The department has jurisdiction over and is responsible for the
construction and maintenance of:
(i) the portion of the state highway located between the back of the
curb on either side of the state highway, or
(ii) if there is no curb, the traveled way, its contiguous shoulders,
and appurtenances.
(b) The department may widen or improve state highways within
municipalities.
(c) (i) A municipality has jurisdiction over all other portions of the
right-of-way and is responsible for construction and maintenance of
the right-of-way.
(ii) If a municipality grants permission for the installation of any
pole, pipeline, conduit, sewer, ditch, culvert, billboard, advertising
sign, or any other structure or object of any kind or character within
the portion of the right-of-way under its jurisdiction:
(A) the permission shall contain the condition that any installation will be removed from the right-of-way at the request of the
municipality; and
(B) the municipality shall cause any installation to be removed
at the request of the department when the department finds the
removal necessary:
(I) to eliminate a hazard to traffic safety;
(II) for the construction and maintenance of the state
highway, or
(III) to meet the requirements of federal regulations.
(d) If it is necessary that a utility, as defined in Section 72-6-116, be
relocated, reimbursement shall be made for the relocation as provided for
in Section 72-6-116.
(e) (i) The department shall construct curbs, gutters, and sidewalks on
the state highways if necessary for the proper control of traffic,
driveway entrances, or drainage.
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require the State to turn around and condemn it for public use.
THE COURT: it would seem to me that that last comment
that you make would be rendered suspect by the fact that if the
original road, indeed, existed there early on, that that road
was abandoned in 1949.
MR. BOHMAN: rt is not abandoned.

THE COURT: it is still used today; is it?
MR. BOYDEN: well, you can't abandon an RS2477 road.
THE COURT: well - okay, legally you can't abandon i t
It is certainly not used.
MR. BOYDEN: t t h a s t o - i t b a s t o b e abandoned - well,
why would you want to use it when d w e is a road THE COURT, YOU got a better road.
MR. BOYDEN: Yeah, exactly.
THE COURT: Yeah, my head is not painted on.
OkayMR. AHLSTROM: YOUT HOOOT?
THE COURT: YCS.
MR. AHLSTROM: May I offer one additional fact that I've
just discovered during due hearing?
THE COURT. Yea, Mr. Ahlstrom.

MR. AHLSTROM: i dunk it has bearing on the colloquy diet
you just had with Mr. Boyden. You asked earlier whether the
State had any knowledge or THE COURT: I d i d
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1l existing law to provide the State with written notice because
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publication was the notice that was provided under the law and
that was sufficient
I also find with die final comment of Mr. Ahlstrom, that
the State was informed of die circumstances giving rise to die
abandonment of die road as sought by die County.
The Court finds further that die State cannot claim a
public interest in opposition to that represented by the
County. The County represented die public interest, and that
has been the legislative scheme in respect to roads of this
nature for some time.
I don't find that there's any evidence of abuse of
discretion, of fraud. I don't find diat diere's any basis for
die Court to conclude diet die reversion dieory to die State
would apply once die County had abandoned its interest
This was a road on private land and private property. All
of die private property owners were consistent in dietr desires
and in dieir requests of u » County d i a t u ^ be provided to
as a private road.
Mr. Bohman, m ask you to prepare an order consistent
Let me ask, is d m anything - your motion for summary
judgment I have commented on already. Is there anything that
I've overlooked in ruling on?
MR. BOHMAN: t don't drink so, Your Honor. A s l
understand your ruling, diere's nothing left in the case. I
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MR. BOHMAN: - so on and so forth. The newspaper artick
of June 17th, 1993, reporting on public' hearing stater
"State Representative Jim Oowans
(phonetic), in attendance said ha
receives more calls on private-property
issues than anytiring dee. His
presentation wbgbedheeviry in favor o f
landowner rights."
Iflmayoffa.wedkihaveaStatBRqpreacntative
official here at die hearing, and he did speak in favor o f '
abandoning diat road.
THE COURT: okay. Wcfl, diat comes as a big surprise to
Mr. Boyden, I'm sure.
MR. BOYDEN: itdoes. Thank yon.
THE COURT. All right WeB, die Court finds that the
State's motion for summary judgment should be and dio same is
denied.
The Court finds diat there was no duty to inform the Stile
as an abutting landowner diat they were not, indeed an abutting
landowner, and that diey were not on the rolls of the County
Assessor as required by die statute for giving of diat notice;
The Court finds that diere is a question of fact as to
vhedier the road even went to die meander line at that time and
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mean, dare may be (Inaudible) routes of getting to die same
point I mean, obviously, the road didn't revert if it was
RS2477, for instance, but THE COURT: ub-huh. Well, Pm going to allow you to
prepare die order consistent bodi with die ruling that I have
rendered from die bench and also widi your pleadings on dns
matter if they're da? matters diat need to be dealt witft
Mr. Boyden, do you have a further question?
MR. BOYDEN: YDS. The State Representative was, in fact,
a representative from the legislature.
THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. BOYDEN: And d m he did - not necessarily die person
who would be responsible for decision making on the part of the
State.
THE COURT: YOUkDOW, I recognize there are significant
concern* (bat you have, Mr. Boyden, in rctpect to notice. And
I do know that a written teller to the State win have a better

chuce or a written notice to the State will hive a better
chance of landing on the right desk. I have a very peculiar
situation in Salt Lake County right now with the Attorney
General's Office claiming that they did not get notice because
h was mailed to the sixth floor of the Court building - of
the A.O.'s Office instead of to the fifth floor of the A.G.'s
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but he didn't appear. And I don't know what's happening in
respect to those circumstances, but I'verepresenteddie State,
I've spent many yean as an Assistant Attorney General and I
sympathize with some of die confusion that occurs in
representing various interests of this nature. So I am not
finding fault, and I am certainly not finding fault with you.
Your presentation here and yourresearchhas been thorough and
complete.
I will tell you that from my perspective at timet I get
frustrated with die attention that I get from die State, and
that' $ just simply a circumstance that happens to exist
That's not something for which the State should be penalized.
It's just something that happens.
All right If you'll prepare the order consistent,
Mr. Bohman?
MR BOHMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: The court's in recess,
(Hearing adjourned.)
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AN ORDINANCE VACATING A PORTION OF A TOOELE COUNTY ROAD
ALONG THE WEST SIDE OF STANSBURY ISLAND. TOOELE, COUNTY,
UTAH

THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF TOOELE COUNTY, UTAH ORDAINS
AS FOLLOWS:
SECTION 1 - PURPOSE. It is the purpose of this Ordinance to vacate and abandon a
portion of a County Road running along the West side of Stansbury Island in Tooele County,
Utah. This Ordinance is adopted pursuant to a petition of certain property owners on
Stansbury Island, which property abuts the County Road. The County Commission finds
that there is good cause for this County road vacation and that it will not be detrimental to
the general interest.
SECTION il - VACATION OF COUNTY ROAD. That portion of the Tooele County Road
situated on the West side of Stansbury Island in Tooele County, Utah, and described as
follows, is hereby formally vacated, pursuant to the provisions of Sections 27-12-102.1
through 27-12-102.5, U.C.A. 1953. as amended.
Commencing at the South line of Section 16, Township 1 North, Range 6 West,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and continuing North through Sections 1 6 , 9 , 4 and
5 of said Township and Range; and thence running through Sections 32, 29, 20,
2 1 , 1 6 and 9 of Township 2 North, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
Since this ordinance has no broad application to the residents of Tooele County and is
of a private nature, it shall not be included in the Tooele County Code.

00033

SECTION Ml - EFFECTIVE DATE. Tnis o-cir.snce s.is'I :e».e e'les: f r r - c n csv< aftc ;
publication in one issue of a newspaper published in and having general circulation in Tooe'e
County, Utah.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Board of County Commissioners of Tooele County have
r7(L
passed, approved and enacted this Ordinance this 2<th day of August, 1993.
BOARD OP COUNTY COMMISSIONERS

LELAND J/JJOGAN, Chairman

.^CTr^aiwp/ftf'HbQan voted K/P*?
)}qrr^fs$oftV Hunsaker votedT At4y
feomVniWioner Griffith voted
\/4A

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

RONALD L. ELTON
Tooele County Attorney
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Addendum F

EXHIBIT 1
AFFIDAVIT OF CALLEEN PESHELL, TOOELE COUNTY RECORDER

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF TOOELE

)
:ss.
)

Calleen Peshell, beingfirstduly sworn, hereby states under oath as follows:
1.

I am the duly elected recorder of Tooele County.

2.

My office has the responsibility of recording all deeds to real property and
preparing plat maps based thereon.

3.

I have reviewed the records in my office, which indicate that in 1993 the
State of Utah, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands was not an owner
of property abutting the West Stansbury Island road proposed for vacation.

4.

In 1993, the only owners of land abutting the road in question were the Six
Mile Ranch Co. (LaVon Bleazard, owner), Craig S. Bleazard, Mark C.
Bleazard, John D. Bleazard, Rhea E. Castagno, Reese Richman, Robert
Cook, United States of America (BLM), and Magnesium Corporation of
America.

DATED this <$l day of September, 1999.

(ani/i64^4^9^ Lit/
Calleen Peshell, Tooele County Recorder
Subscribed and sworn before me this /y]
Peshell.

day ofS^)tember, 1999, by Calleen

EXHIBIT 2

AFFIDAVIT OF JERRIE PAYSTRUP, TOOELE COUNTY ASSESSOR
STATE OF UTAH

)
!SS.

COUNTY OF TOOELE

)

Jerrie Paystrup, beingfirstduly sworn, hereby states under oath as follows:
1. I am the duly elected assessor of Tooele County.
2. My office has the responsibility of maintaining the tax assessment rolls
pertaining to all real property in Tooele County.
3. I have reviewed the records and rolls in my office, which indicate that in 1993
the State of Utah, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands was not listed as
a property owner on Stansbuiy Island, neither did it have a mailing address on
the rolls of the county assessor.
DATED this jU^day of September, 1999.

o

Jerae^Paystrup,
aystrup, Tooelee Cdunty Assess*
Assessor

Subscribed and sworn before me this^S^day of September, 1999, by Jerrie
Paystrup.

—•J^J"" ~
/*^**\A
A f^zF**\ **
*j
7

—

Notary Public

I

OEBOBAHC.SAGERS ,
4 7 So jth Ma»n
Tooee Utah 84074
f/y Cu^miss'on E<P«'e*
May 14 2002

State^ofjJtah —
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Addendum G

Ll/01/2000 12:21:07
PARCEL ##
NAME
PROP ADDRESS
01-268-0-0002 STATE OF UTAH
02-013-0-0011 STATE OF UTAH
02-138-0-0004 STATE OF UTAH
02-138-0-0005 STATE OF UTAH
03-087-0-0001 STATE OF UTAH
04-087-0-0001 STATE OF UTAH
04-087-0-0002 STATE OF UTAH
04-087-0-0005 STATE OF UTAH
04-087-0-0006 STATE OF UTAH
04-101-C-0016 STATE OF UTAH
04-101-L-0001 STATE OF UTAH
05-100-0-0001 STATE OF UTAH
06-011-0-0002 STATE OF UTAH
06-058-0-0004 STATE OF UTAH
06-079-D-0002 STATE OF UTAH
06-079-D-0016 STATE OF UTAH
06-079-D-0032 STATE OF UTAH
06-079-G-0002 STATE OF UTAH
06-079-G-0016 STATE OF UTAH
06-079-G-0032 STATE OF UTAH
06-079-G-0036 STATE OP UTAH
06-135-0-0001 STATE OF UTAH
06-136-0-0001 STATE OF UTAH
ESC quits, * & t moves bar, PgDn, PgUp gets more data, «-

CITY

<Enter> selects

1/01/2000 12:21:34
PARCEL ##
07-089-0-0002 STATE
07-095-0-0002 STATE
04-026-G-0001 STATE
04-101-D-0001 STATE
04-101-K-0002 STATE
06-125-0-0002 STATE
06-125-0-0004 STATE
06-126-0-0002 STATE
06-126-0-0003 STATE
01-002-0-0012 STATE
01-002-0-0013 STATE
01-002-0-0014 STATE
01-003-0-0008 STATE
01-003-0-0009 STATE
01-003-0-0010 STATE
01-003-0-0011 STATE
01-003-0-0012 STATE
01-003-0-0016 STATE
01-003-0-0028 STATE
01-003-0-0036 STATE
01-003-0-0037 STATE
01-004-0-0003 STATE
01-004-n-nnne; CTJVTC

NAME
OF UTAH
OF UTAH
OP UTAH
OF UTAH
OF UTAH DIV OP FACI
OP UTAH WILDLIFE RE
OP UTAH WILDLIFE RE
OP UTAH WILDLIFE RE
OP UTAH WILDLIFE RE
ROAD COMMISSION
ROAD COMMISSION
ROAD COMMISSION
ROAD COMMISSION
ROAD COMMISSION
ROAD COMMISSION
ROAD COMMISSION
ROAD COMMISSION
ROAD COMMISSION
ROAD COMMISSION
ROAD COMMISSION
ROAD COMMISSION
ROAD COMMISSION
Dr»an m M U T e e T M T

PROP ADDRESS

CITY

11/01/2000 12:22:05
PARCEL ##
NAME
PROP ADDRESS
CITY
01-004-0-0008 STATE ROAD COMMISSION
01-004-0-0010 STATE ROAD COMMISSION
01-004-0-0012 STATE ROAD COMMISSION
01-005-0-0006 STATE ROAD COMMISSION
01-005-0-0008 STATE ROAD COMMISSION
01-006-0-0002 STATE ROAD COMMISSION
01-006-0-0004 STATE ROAD COMMISSION
01-141-0-0001 STATE ROAD COMMISSION
01-141-0-0004 STATE ROAD COMMISSION
01-141-0-0009 STATE ROAD COMMISSION
01-263-0-0010 STATE ROAD COMMISSION
04-070-0-0032 STATE ROAD COMMISSION
04-074-0-0002 STATE ROAD COMMISSION
06-052-0-0011 STATE ROAD COMMISSION
01-262-0-0002 STATELINE PROPERTIES INC
01-262-0-0005 STATELINE PROPERTIES INC
10-045-0-0025 STATHAM FRANK & BETTY TRU MARLETTE DR: 705
TOOELE
10-024-0-0001 STATHAM SCOTT & PAULA
08-055-0-0009 STEADMAN BRUCE T & LYNDA
02-004-0-0021 STEADMAN BRUCE T & LYNDA
08-017-0-0056 STEADMAN DAVID A & THERES N NELSON: 685
TOOELE
12-026-0-0214 STEADMAN DAVID L
E 0180 N: 592
TOOELE
11-015-0-0138 STEADMAN GARY JT
N 0830 E: 828
TOOELE
ESC quits, * & t moves bar, PgDn, PgUp gets more data, •<—J <Enter> select

11/01/2000 12:20:42
PARCEL ##
01-252-0-0001
01-258-0-0018
01-266-0-0006
01-266-0-0007
01-267-0-0006
01-269-0-0007
01-266-0-0003
01-252-0-0002
01-252-0-0003
01-267-0-0003
01-267-0-0002
01-267-0-0007
01-267-0-0001
01-262-0-0003
01-266-0-0002
01-265-0-0003
01-269-0-0010
04-087-0-0007
04-087-0-0008
04-087-0-0009

STATE
STATE
STATE
STATE
STATE
STATE
STATE
STATE
STATE
STATE
STATE
STATE
STATE
STATE
STATE
STATE
STATE
STATE
STATE
STATE

NAME
LINE PROPERTIES INC
LINE PROPERTIES INC
LINE PROPERTIES INC
LINE PROPERTIES INC
LINE PROPERTIES INC
LINE PROPERTIES INC
LINE PROPERTIES LTD
LINE PROPERTIES LTD
LINE PROPERTIES LTD
LINE PROPERTIES LTD
LINE PROPERTIES LTD
LINE PROPERTIES LTD
LINE PROPERTIES LTD
LINE PROPERTIES LTD
LINE PROPERTIES LTD
LINE PROPERTIES LTD
LINE PROPERTIES LTD.
OF UT DIV OF WILDLI
OF UT DIV OF WILDLI
OF UT DIV OF WILDLI

PROP ADDRESS

CITY

11/01/2000 12:33:20
T O O E L E

C O U N T Y

C O R P O

R A T I O N

TAXROLL FILE MAINTENANCE

Parcel 01-268-0-0002
Name 1 STATE OF UTAH
Name 2
Address 3 TRIAD CENTER
SALT LAKE CITY
District 003 WENDOVER
Mortgage

UT 84101-

ACRES
0.00

PROPERTY

TOTALS

Last Yr Tax
Tax Levied
Special Tax
Abatements
Payments
Amount Due
Back Taxes

2000
MARKET
TAXABLE
0
0

0.00 |
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
No

1999
MARKET
TAXABLE
0
0

0.00
M)odify

Tear Built :

EX 2000

+/-

Degal

S)earch

B)a.ck Taxes

ESC

: Building Type :: Square Footage :0:

[istory Description:
Legal Description for 01-268-0-0002
'ax Rate :0.012058:

/

/

r 1/2 NB 1/4; SB 1/4 NW 1/4; NE 1/4 SW 1/4; S 1/2 SW 1/4; NW 1/4 SB 1/4; OF
.ECTION 8, TIS, R19W, SLB&M. FROM BLM. 280.00 AC

11/01/2000 12:27:20

Year Built :

: Building Type :: Square Footage :0:

History Description:
Legal Description for 02-013-0-0011
Tax Rate :0.011959:

/ /

BEG 880 FT, S & 103.12 RODS W OF NE CORNER, SEC 33 N 79 30« W 80 FT M/L SWL'
225FT, M/L ALONG HIWAY R/W LINE, EASTERLY 53 FT M/L TO DITCH, TH NELY 14
RODS 9.75 FT TO BEG 0.00 AC

11/01/2000 12:31:13

TAXROLL FILE MAINTENANCE
Parcel 02-138-0-0004
EX 2000
Name 1 STATE OF UTAH
Name 2
Address 355 NORTH TEMPLE STE 400
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84108District 001 TOOELE
Mortgage
ACRES
0.00

PROPERTY

TOTALS

2000
TAXABLE
0
0

No
1999

MARKET

TAXABLE
0

0

0.00
M)odify

fear Built :

MARKET

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Last Yr Tax
Tax Levied
Special Tax
Abatements
Payments
Amount Due
Back Taxes

+/-

Degal

S)earch

B)ack Taxes

ESC

: Building Type :: Square Footage :0:

listory Description:
Legal Description for 02-138-0-0004
Tax Rate :0.011959:

/ /

JW1/4 OF SECTION 7 T3S R4W SLB&M (FIRST TIME IN COMPUTER FOR 1996) 160.29 AC

11/01/2000 12:35:47
T 0 0 EL E

C O U H T Y C

R A T I O N

TAXROLL FILE MAINTENANCE

Parcel 03-087-0-0001
EX 2000
Name 1 STATE OF UTAH
Name 2
Address 3 TRIAD CENTER
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101District 010 O.D. MOSQUITO
Mortgage
ACRES
0.00

PROPERTY

TOTALS

+/-

Degal

S)earch

No
1999

MARKET

B)ack Taxes

: Building Type :: Square Footage :0:

History Description:
Legal Description for 03-087-0-0001
Tax Rate :0.009684:
640.00 AC

2000
TAXABLE
0
0

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

TAXABLE
0

0.00
M)odify

Year Built :

MARKET

0.00 1

Last Yr Tax
Tax Levied
Special Tax
Abatements
Payments
Amount Due
Back Taxes

/ /

ESC

0

11/01/2000 12:38:52
T O O E L E

C O U N T Y

C O R P Q

R A T I O N

TAXROLL FILE MAINTENANCE

Parcel 04-087-0-0001
EX 2000
Name 1 STATE OF UTAH
Name 2
Address SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111District 010 O.D. MOSQUITO
Mortgage
ACRES
0.00

PROPERTY

TOTALS

2000
MARKET
TAXABLE
0
0

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

No

1999
MARKET
TAXABLE
0
0

0.00
M)odify

Ifear Built :

Last Yr Tax
Tax Levied
Special Tax
Abatements
Payments
Amount Due
Back Taxes

+/-

Degal

S)earch

B)ack Taxes

: Building Type :: Square Footage : 0;

History Description:
Legal Description for 04-087-0-0001
rax Rate -.0.009684:

/ /

W 1/2 OF SW 1/4, SEC 3, T1S,R7W, CONT 80 AC 80.00 AC

ESC

11/01/2000 12:39:36
T

.,0___0__E..L_E.

C O D . N_ T J

C O R P Oj.!f..LLQJ.,

TAXROLL FILE MAINTENANCE
Parcel 04-101-C-0016
EX 2000
Name 1 STATE OF UTAH
Name 2
Address 355 WEST NORTH TEMPLE
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84180-1204
District 019 NO TOOELE CO FIRE DIST
Mortgage
ACRES
0.00

PROPERTY

TOTALS

2000
TAXABLE
0
0

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
No
1999

MARKET

TAXABLE
0

0

0.00
M)odify

Year Built :

MARKET

Last Yr Tax
Tax Levied
Special Tax
Abatements
Payments
Amount Due
Back Taxes

+/-

Degal

S)earch

B)ack Taxes

ESC

: Building Type :: Square Footage :0:

History Description:
Legal Description for 04-101-C-0016
Tax Rate :0.009386:

/ /

THE E 1/2 OF E 1/2 OF SECTION 16 TIS R12W SLB&M NEW ACCOUNT FOR 1993 FROM BL

11/01/2000

12:42:11
TOOELE .CJ^J^TJ^^

R A T I O N

TAXROLL FILE MAINTENANCE

1 P a r c e l 0 6 - 0 1 1 - 0 - 0 0 0 2 E X 2000
Name 1 STATE OP UTAH
Name 2
Address C/O STATE LAND BOARD
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101District 019 NO TOOELE CO FIRE DIST
Mortgage
ACRES
0.00

PROPERTY

TOTALS

2000
TAXABLE
0
0

No
1999

MARKET

TAXABLE
0

0.00
M)odify

5fear Built :

MARKET

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Last Yr Tax
Tax Levied
Special Tax
Abatements
Payments
Amount Due
Back Taxes

+/-

Degal

S)earch

B)ack Taxes

ESC

: Building Type :: Square Footage :0:

History Description:
Legal Description for 06-011-0-0002
Tax Rate :0.009386:

/ /

NW 1/4 OP NW 1/4, S 1/2 OP NW 1/4, SW 1/4, SEC 15, T4S, R4W, SLM, CONT 280
kC 280.00 AC

0

11/01/2000 12:43:50

Year Built :

: Building Type :: Square Footage :0:

History Description:
Legal Description for 04-101-K-0002
Tax Rate :0.009684:

CSHAFF 06/16/1998

BEG AT S 1/4 COR OF SECTION 16, TIS R15W SLB&M, TH N 88° 37»38" W 406.42 FT
ALG SEC LI, TH N 1° 22'22" E 200 FT,, TH S 88° 37'38" E 406.42 FT, TH S 1°
22'22" W 200.00 FT TO THE POB OUT OF 4-101-K-l 1.87 AC

Ll/01/2000

12:44:41
TOOELE

COUNTY

C O R P O R A T I O N

TAXROLL FILE MAINTENANCE

Parcel 06-125-0-0002
EX 2000
Name 1 STATE OF UTAH WILDLIFE RESOUR
Name 2
Address 1596 NO TEMPLE
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84116District 017 O.D. WATER CONSERVANCY
Mortgage
ACRES
0.00

PROPERTY

TOTALS

2000
TAXABLE
0
0

No
1999

MARKET

TAXABLE
0

0.00
M)odify

ear Built :

MARKET

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Last Yr Tax
Tax Levied
Special Tax
Abatements
Payments
Amount Due
Back Taxes

+/-

Degal

S)earch

B)ack Taxes

: Building Type :: Square Footage :0

istory Description:
Legal Description for 06-125-0-0002
ax Rate :0.009056:

/ /

1/2 OF SE 1/4, SEC 16, T7S, R5W, CONT 80 AC 80.00 AC

ESC

0

11/01/2000 12:45:21
^fywwuSnnn^nnn^nnn^nnnTn^wymnn^nnn^nn^nnn^nnn0

T O O E L

R

A

T

I

O

N

- TAXROLL FILE MAINTENANCE
Parcel 06-126-0-0002
EX 2000
Name 1 STATE OF UTAH WILDLIFE RESOUR
Name 2
Address 1596 NO TEMPLE
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84116District 017 O.D. WATER CONSERVANCY
Mortgage
ACRES
0.00

PROPERTY

2000
TAXABLE
0
0

No
1999

MARKET

TAXABLE
0

0

0.00

TOTALS
M)odify

Year Built :

MARKET

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Last Yr Tax
Tax Levied
Special Tax
Abatements
Payments
Amount Due
Back Taxes

+/-

L)egal

: Building Type

S)earch

B)ack Taxes

ESC

Square Footage :0

History Description:
Legal Description for 06-126-0-0002
Tax Rate :0.009056:

/ /

W 1/2 OF NW 1/4, OF SEC 28, T7S, R5W, LESS 2.60 AC TO ST RD COMM, CONT 77.40
AC 77.40 AC

